SCUBA to Flying Time

The pilot that was the subject of last week’s post on decompression sickness should have waited at least 24 hours before taking to the air. The dive they took didn’t require a decompression stop, but their cruising altitude for the flight was above 8000 MSL. Whether the airplane was pressurized or not doesn’t make a difference.

Wintertime Fuel Checks

Last week in this post I asked…

Before you pulled the helicopter out of the hanger this morning, you checked the sumps and it looked good. It’s 10 degrees C outside and snowed last night, so you’re happy this will be a quick refuel–just 3 gallons. You drive the fuel truck from the tank out to the ramp, pick up the nozzle, pop it in the tank, and get your fuel. You know the truck is topped off every night, and you’ve never had debris or water come out of this tank. So, is there a good reason to check the sumps again?

This is something I actually encountered, and the issue isn’t the risk of condensation, but introduction of snow from the fuel nozzle. The fuel truck sat outside overnight and was covered with a good bit of snow. The fuel nozzle just sits exposed and laying flat on the side of the truck. As students would fill their tanks, they’d lay the nozzle back down on the bed of the truck, where it could get packed with snow. The next guy in line, if he didn’t check the nozzle, would get a snowball blown into the tank. Once the snow melted, it’d end up at the bottom of the tank. Most students don’t check the tanks after fueling, in part because it’s a reliable source, and because there’s a bit of competition for the fuel truck (which has the waste container strapped to it). Fortunately, nobody ended up with much water in their tanks before somebody noticed what was going on.

Decompression Sickness

For some reason, I always had trouble remembering the rules for flying after SCUBA diving. I wouldn’t say it’s because I don’t care, but since I don’t dive or know anybody who does…. But the FAA seems to put a disproportionate amount of weight on this topic than it would seemingly merit: in the PHAK, it gets as much space devoted to it as stress and carbon monoxide poisoning. I’ve also seen questions on decompression sickness on the written exams (and, for the record, I answered the question correctly). And, I don’t recall the operator (or airlines, for that matter) asking us about recent diving when we did our tour in Kauai. So the whole topic seems to me to be a warning to Private Pilots, and a reminder to those who covered this info in their dive certification class.

Well, if it helps you remember the guidelines, and maybe scores you an extra couple of points on the written test, here’s a clip from the Spike TV’s show, 1000 Ways to Die. (If you need to see the whole episode in all its full-screen, HD glory, it’s available on Fancast). Yeah, I don’t normally watch this–I just happened on it while looking for MXC, which is the best thing since MST3000. I’ll be interested to see if they make it through 100 ways to die before getting axed themselves. Easy question: based on the info in the clip, how long should these guys have waited before getting in their airplane?

p.s. The caisson disease is interesting. When building bridges, sometimes the engineers will use these caissons–vessels that are sunk into the bottom of the riverbed. They then pump out all the water, and keep them evacuated using pressurized air. Workers can then descend into the caisson to do whatever they need to do for building the structure. Essentially, they’re SCUBA diving (without the “self-contained” part), and breathing pressurized air.

Last Week in the Forums: Check ride and alternator failures

A thread on VR this week about the alternator light is another example of why I’m doing this. In the R22 POH, the alternator light emergency procedure gets just a paragraph and is pretty straightforward: alternator switch off, non-essential equipment off, alternator switch on. Land as soon as practical if the light remains illuminated.

The thread on the forums this week started with a cracked drive belt, but moved into a discussion about the mechanical reasons the alternator light might become illuminated the grief that could cause you. In the POH, the primary concern is loss of electrical power, which would cause a failure of the governor and tachometer, and no way of regulating your MR RPMs. Even without an alternator, the battery should have 10-15 minutes of reserve power, allowing you to follow the procedure for landing as soon as practical (go to the nearest airport where repairs can be made). What isn’t in the POH is the risk of a loose alternator belt flying around the engine compartment. Once freed from the pulleys, it can become entangled in the drive belts, leading to their failure and an emergency autorotation. This is exactly what happened in a September 2007 accident. In this case, the first indication of a problem was the sound of the alternator belt breaking, followed by RPM instability. However, one of the posts on the VR thread suggested a scenario where an alternator light could indicate a failing alternator or alternator bearing, leading to failure of the belt itself. Even if the drive belts aren’t damaged, the belt that came loose in the 2007 accident contacted the oil cooler and lines. Conclusion? Consider making an emergency landing if the alternator light illuminates, and figure the problem out on the ground rather than in the air.

The other thread that was really interesting was about a pilot who failed his commercial ride. Basically, his instructor filled the tanks on the helicopter while the pilot was doing his ground portion of the check ride. He didn’t recalculate the W&B for the actual fuel load, and ended up 16 lbs over MGW. Shitty way to learn a lesson, but props to this guy for posting is story. I wonder if there’s an inherent complacency toward fuel because we do it so casually for our cars (except in Oregon and New Jersey!). Planning your fuel load is the first important step, but what got the pilot on his check ride was confirming what went in. Where I trained, we did the fueling ourselves, but I’ve been to plenty of airports where you touch down to refuel, and a truck comes bounding over to you. These guys aren’t going to attach the same importance you are of putting on exactly what you tell them. This job would be easier if you could always trust your fuel gauges or had a dipstick for exactly determining your fuel load. If you have the R22 weight and balance calculator and a smart phone with an Excel application (like Grid Magic), you can recalculate your fuel load right after you finish fueling.

A bigger problem that I’ve seen is not testing fuel for water or debris. Flying out of the same airport, you get to trusting your fuel source. Out in the real world–where you’re going to be flying from different locations, maybe getting fuel from barrels cached in the woods of North BFE–having a well entrained habit of always checking your sump might be a good idea. Since I learned to fly airplanes at an airport with a fuel service, I got into that habit. But another good reason is that things change, and you don’t always realize the implications. While working on my instrument rating, I started seeing rust particles popping up in the sump. This was after months of not having any indication of a problem. Turns out, the pump on the fuel truck was switched out while the original was being serviced, and that was the source.

Here’s another good one. Before you pulled the helicopter out of the hanger this morning, you checked the sumps and it looked good. It’s 10 degrees C outside and snowed last night, so you’re happy this will be a quick refuel–just 3 gallons. You drive the fuel truck from the tank out to the ramp, pick up the nozzle, pop it in the tank, and get your fuel. You know the truck is topped off every night, and you’ve never had debris or water come out of this tank. So, is there a good reason to check the sumps again? Anybody make a guess. Bueller? Bueller?

On an unrelated note, a couple of weeks ago, N74607, my favorite of all the R22 Beta IIs that I’ve flown, met it’s end in the Owyhee mountains. No injuries, and maybe it’ll fly again.

North Pacific Hurricanes

The North Pacific is a source for some pretty impressive low pressure systems. Stick them in the GOM, and they’d look like hurricanes. The one that blew in thisOR-Winds week had a pressure below 1000 mb and winds in the 40-60 knot range, which rivals a category 1 hurricane. The difference, I suppose, is that the warm waters of the GOM produce convective activity that strengthens the low, but this source of energy is missing in the higher latitudes of the Pacific. This storm caused some problems on the coast, but the winds dissipated pretty quickly.

What I wanted to point out about this particular system was the correlation between the pressure gradients and the winds. In this overlay of the SFC Prognostic Chart and the Wind Streamlines, you can see the low in the upper left corner, off the Washington coastline. Just southeast of the low the isobars are stacked pretty close together, but spread out as you move south along the coastline. The wind streamlines reflect the effect this has on wind speeds: southeast of the low, right where the isobars are stacked, the winds peak at hurricane force. North and south of the low, the winds meander around and peter out as the pressure gradient–the distance between the isobars–dissipates.

Do you know what the hatched area that stretches from central Mexico, through Utah and all the way up the west coast on the Wind Streamlines graphic is? Here’s a hint: the wind streamlines image I used was for the 3000 MSL level.

Downwash Lesson Plan

A couple of days ago, Tim McAdams posted on his blog, AOPA Hover Power, a couple of examples where pilots have been oblivious to the effect their downwash has on other aircraft. He warns that many pilots either don’t know about the effect their downwash can have on aircraft or personnel on the ground, or they don’t care. The AIM specifically puts the responsibility and discretion on helicopter pilots when judging the effects of downwash on persons and property on the surface (4-3-17(a)(3)). That’s the rationale behind the new lesson plan I just added, Rotor Downwash. (Maria Langer has also written about an incident where another pilot…well, just read her story.)

I trained at a busy school, where there were usually 3 or more R22s on the apron, and occasionally a few R44s, and we were next to a crowded parking area and the fuel pumps. Although the extent of our formal training in managing (and anticipating) the effects of downwash was the one paragraph in the AIM, you learn pretty quickly to keep doors latched, cowlings secured, blades slightly out-of-line with the tail boom, and a hand on your cap when others are arriving or departing. We also frequently had to frequently dodge airplanes that were seemingly oblivious to the recommendations in the AIM.  With the unwitting cooperation of the plank drivers at that airport, I’ve done the experiment and can say that an R22 on approach probably isn’t going to overturn an RV or a 152.

A larger helicopter though, packs a bit of force. I was waiting for a lesson at a small FBO in Oregon a while back. It was an early summer day, with calm winds and clear skies. The operator had just landed a fire contract, and they were practicing long-lining with it on the taxiway. While I was waiting, the mechanic moved a Cessna high-wing out of the hangar to pull out another aircraft, and left it there without tie-downs or chocks. After a half hour, the UH-1 returned to the hangar and went about setting the bucket down so it could land. The rotor diameter on a UH-1 is about 50 fee and they were working a 100-ft longline, so the Cessna was now within the 3-2-1 area (see the new Lesson Plan). There was an oddly calm moment between when the Uh-1 settled into a high-hover and when the downwash hit us. That Cessna was on its way the second the downwash hit us, and made it 20 ft before the mechanic and I stopped it. The force of the downwash from an R22 isn’t much, but the UH-1 laid down an impressive gust. This scene replayed itself almost exactly the same the very next day–the mechanic didn’t chock the plane, the ground crew didn’t prep the area, and the pilot (who worked at the FBO), didn’t make a radio call to have somebody secure the little plane.

Go check out the Rotor Downwash Lesson Plan.

The R22 Power Check: It Sure Sounds Like a Great Idea

Every year since I’ve been watching the Vertical Reference forums, there has been an “R22 Power Check” thread that pops up. When I saw it come up last month, I thought it’d make a great lesson plan. The thread always gets lots of views, users will put a lot of work into writing their responses, and on the surface, it’s a pretty important topic, right? Now that I’ve spent a couple of hours going over 10+ pages of posts from Vertical Reference, I’m not so sure.

The idea, as I understand it, is that you want a way of checking whether you will have enough power to make an off-airport landing. I’m going to mull over the threads on this for a while longer, but lemme put out this scenario that I got on a check ride:

Bubba & Sons Company has a station on a 6200-ft mountaintop that needs to be serviced, and they’re on the phone wanting to know if you can take Bubba Jr up there in an R22 to do the work. At the airport (2450 MSL), it’s typical weather for the desert in the summer: calm winds, 30 C and rising, and CAVU. You’ve flown with Bubba Jr, and he’s at 210 lbs, plus 20 lbs of gear. The nearest fuel is a 50-minute flight from the station, and the weight and balance shows you need to be at MGW to have the fuel to legally complete the flight. Do you take the flight?

There aren’t any tricks to this question. I looked at the HOGE, fuel requirements, and weather, and declined the flight. The HOGE suggests that the flight can be done, but that’s making several assumptions about the flight–that the temperature won’t be any warmer than 30 C when I get there and that my fuel burn will be at least 10 gph–and quite possibly my abilities. At 200 hours of experience, I told the examiner I wouldn’t do it since it was too close to the limits of the aircraft’s performance, but that’d I’d be happy to send him on it or to take a Raven II. He nodded and said that the customer would accept the R44, then went on to grill me on aerodynamics.

Right here, right now, I don’t see anything to support the need for this type of power check if you have reviewed your performance limitations before the flight. Realistically, you know what elevations you’ll be working in, and from that you should know what your HOGE limits will be. The approach I’ve taken during training is to determine the limit for performance, and then apply a buffer to cover things you cannot anticipate (like humidity, winds calm, a confined area, or higher-than-expected temperatures at the landing site). Reasonable estimates for all of these can be made comfortably while at your desk, and you can reevaluate winds, fuel, and temperature onsite. As long as those are below your limits, you can make the landing. (Since I’ve flown mostly at elevations that top out around 5500 ft, I’ve always had at least a 1000-ft margin to work with. I’m not sure whether this is too conservative to be practical though.)

So, to apply this method to the case above without going on for too much longer, I can assume winds are going to be calm on the mountain and that it’ll still be warm when I get there–maybe 28 C. I can also estimate my fuel burn at 8 gph and determine what my weight will be when I arrive. I can’t do anything about my passenger’s weight, my fuel load (my limitation on reserve fuel is higher than the required 20 minutes), or the landing zone to tilt the odds in my favor. Knowing this, I can look at the charts and tell I’m not going to be comfortable with this scenario. But, I can do the flight first thing tomorrow a.m. when it’s 15 C cooler. By the charts, I get a HOGE that’s 750 feet higher than what I need. Or, if I get to the landing zone with anything less that 1340 lbs, I’ll have additional power to draw on. The odds are now stacked in my favor. If I get there and there’s a 10 knot wind or the temperature is 12 C…Bonus!

The other way of looking at it…and this is something that I’ve used on just about every flight…is to set a limit and stick to it. We’re going to go work on pinnacle landings today? Okay, temperature, weight after 30-minute fuel burn…we can sustain a HOGE below 6500 MSL. Don’t ask me to go into 7000-ft terrain to practice pinnacles. In fact, maybe I don’t want to be practicing pinnacles above 6250 MSL. I’m also going to control for lower-than-expected performance from the aircraft by checking my hover power before departure. Is it higher than what I would expect from this aircraft on this day? And as I’m approaching the landing zone, does the OAT gauge show a temperature near or below what I used to calculate my performance back at base? Where is my MAP throughout the approach? Am I nearing my MAP limit as I’m getting close to losing ETL? I should be clear that I’m not suggesting that a chart in a book is the be-all and end-all to figuring out if you have the performance to land. But that that chart, developed by a pilot more capable than most of us and under controlled circumstances, is one part of the ADM equation (dammit, there’s another post to do…).

Back to the threads. Forget for a second that I didn’t see a consensus method described for conducting the power check, and that there is no procedure for a power check given in the R22/R44 POH or Maneuver Guide, or any FAA publication. But in the threads, numbers get thrown around, such as, “If you have a power reserve of X inches in cruise/in the downwind/at minimum power speed/etc, you can make a vertical landing” or “If you have less than Y inches of power, you can only make a run-on landing.” These numbers come from a variety of sources, some possibly more credible than others, but again, they aren’t coming from RHC or the FAA. On top of that, when they start getting into differentiating between a normal landing, a run-on landing, and a no-hover landing, those would be indications that we’re operating very close to the edge of the envelope. At that point, the question isn’t “Can I do this?” but instead “Should I do this?” Or maybe it’s “I bet I can do this!” that necessitates the power check?

If I’m wrong, I hope somebody with more real-world and teaching experience will set me straight here. But isn’t this analogous to dealing with weather limitations? We know what we can legally fly in, but we should also know what we are trained to fly in, and we should set a further buffer so that if conditions get worse, we have an out. But the whole power check concept seems to be just like the “Let’s go take a look” mentality toward weather. Instead of knowing that the procedure is well within the limitations of our aircraft and our training, it’s like saying “Maybe we shouldn’t do this, but maybe we can.”

Two last things I’ll throw out here. First, there’s the “HOGE power check”, which is something along the lines of getting near your LZ, slowing into a HOGE, and figuring out if you can maintain it. I guess, if you really want to be sure and the LZ you are moving into doesn’t offer any good escape routes for a go-around, maybe this is fine. It does entail some risk, and you may not get a good answer from it if you do the power check under the safest conditions (eg, 1000′ AGL, where it will be cooler and windier). The second is a mountain flying technique that I’ll cover another time, where you make several very slow passes at the same elevation as your LZ. This is for dealing with poor escape routes, downdrafts, weather conditions you couldn’t anticipate prior to departure, and nasty landing zones; it’s also part of a 3-5 pass low reconnaissance. I’ve read about these techniques, but wasn’t taught them. They do seem applicable to real-world applications scenarios that entail a higher degree of risk than you would encounter as a low-time pilot. My thought is that they entail more risk than is appropriate for flight training, but I don’ t know.

Right now this is all just armchair musings–I would like to figure it out though. It’s either a training deficiency–all 3 of the VR threads were initiated by CFIs–or maybe it shouldn’t be part of what students are being taught. As mentioned in several of the posts on VR, most instructors and students can recite the procedure, but they can’t explain the rationale behind it or cite a source for it (other than their instructor). Think about that.

Vegas Recap

vegas sign

Just back from the Vegas Career Seminar. Overall, I think Lyn said there were about 120 attendees, down from about 200 last year. Almost all of them were at least CFIs (there were less than 10 ATPs), but I didn’t get to see a tally for how many were <1000 hours and unemployed. Since I was reviewing resumes during the sessions, I missed all but about 3 of the talks. Between the resumes that I looked at and the talks that I did get to go to, here’s what I took away from the seminar:

Supply, not insurance, is driving hiring minimums

With the downturn in the economy, the supply of pilots has ballooned. For those of us with less than 1000 hours, that has meant CFI jobs just aren’t out there. But the situation isn’t any better for 1000 hour pilots. Last year, 1000 hours was your golden ticket. Now, GOM, Ditch, and Alaska operators can ask for 1200-1500 hours as their minimum, since there are plenty of pilots at this level of experience that are looking for work. In addition, corporate, logging, and fire/utility operations have scaled back. These pilots, which were sitting on >2000 hours of experience, are now competing for jobs that were usually open to 1000-hour pilots. The result: getting a job at 1000 hours is no longer a given, and it’s actually very competitive.

There are jobs, just not many (and none are being advertised)

Lyn said there were a few pilots that backed out of the seminar last-minute on account of getting hired someplace, although he didn’t say where and what level of experience. The HEMS operators were hiring, and based on some of the applicants that I talked to while reviewing resumes, I’m guessing several of those guys have interviews or offers. AirLog was there, but they aren’t hiring anytime soon. Papillion might be looking for pilots next season, and the guys that were in Vegas should have a leg up.

Objective statements

Generic objectives statements were the most common problem I saw. This is my opinion: for the guy applying for just a pilot position, an objectives statement isn’t going to help you much, and a generic one might hurt you. When employers are looking at resumes, they look first at certificates, then at experience, and then at safety record. My feeling (supported by discussions with some employers) is that an objective statement gets in the way.

The main thing about an objective statement is that it needs to be specific for the job, and the really effective ones I’ve seen (not in aviation) have used the applicant’s skills (eg, as a manager) to specify an objective in the job. For 95% of the resumes I saw, the objective for the job (pilot) is to be safe. Lyn, however, likes to see an objective statement along the lines of, “To obtain a tour pilot position at Papillion,” since this lets the employer know that you wrote that resume specifically for them.

Leaving out significant work experience

For low-time pilots, you’re expected to have a short work history section, but that doesn’t mean everybody should have just a few lines there. Several applicants had started businesses or had other significant work achievements, but only listed the dates, job titles, and the names of the companies where they work. My advice is to think hard about your job history and find titles or achievements that are going to set you apart from other applicants, even if they are relatively small. Something like that will get you farther than just given a laundry list of your last 5 jobs.

Cover letters

Don’t need them for a job fair. Recruiters are going to look closely at your certs and flight time, then skim the rest of the page. Mostly though, you want to be ready to speak to them about the bottom half of your resume (and that is what a cover letter is for when you can’t be standing in front of the recruiter). Also, the cover letters I did see were too generic to make a good impression. First of all, you should find a name to go at the top of the page–do some research and figure out the name of somebody who might be looking at the resume–chief pilot, recruiter, director of operations, doesn’t matter, as long as you don’t start off “To whom it may concern…” The rest of the cover letter should very specifically say why your experience makes you perfect for this job.

Little things

Typos, spelling mistakes, inconsistencies in the date format. Sometimes they get noticed, and if they are off, it suggests a lack of attention to detail. The other thing I saw was flight times not being aligned in a column. Try setting up tabs so that the ones are all right aligned and “hours” is left aligned. Think about how you’d want it lined up if you were going to try to add them up.

More

Those were the things that I remember most, but intermittently I’ll try and post other hints. If you haven’t already, you can provide feedback for me or ask questions by clicking on the Career tab. I’m also adding my hypoxia lesson plan…inspired by several days hiking in the Spring Mountains at 7000-11,000 feet. Hell of a change coming from sea level.

Conducting a Flight Review

As a new addition to the resources area, I put together a guide for helicopter CFIs for conducting the flight review, and assembled a few resources for you to use.

As a new CFI, a flight review is something you could get called on to do out of nowhere. This is a challenge for the new CFI who’s not working at a flight school: you’ve never been through a flight review yourself, you have nobody to ask for advice, and you are very likely giving the review to somebody with hundreds of more hours experience than you. The instructors I’ve talked to have learned a lot when doing flight reviews, but it doesn’t mean that you don’t bring anything to the table. You actually have an advantage–your book knowledge is current, and that’s one of the most important parts of the flight review. As a new addition to the resources area, I put together a guide for helicopter CFIs conducting a flight review, and assembled a few resources for you to use. Check it out here.

Just Let Me Explain

Those of you who are paying attention noticed 2 new tabs at the top of the page…the Career tab, which I already posted on, and FL005 T-shirts, which takes you to a storefront with helicopter-inspired T-shirts. Just to put your mind at ease, wikiRFM was not some ruse to get you to buy a T-shirt so I could pay off my credit cards. From a financial perspective, both of these sites are pretty stupid ideas, and with the software, domain names, and time invested, I won’t ever come close to recouping my costs.

FL005 is actually a way an investment in the wikiRFM. Follow my logic, flimsy as it is. The T-shirt shop is interactive–you can rate and comment on the designs, recommend designs if you think mine are kinda lame, and eventually I’ll engineer a way for you to post pics of yourself in an FL005 T-shirt on the front page. Likewise, wikiRFM is completely interactive, and after fooling around with FL005, maybe you’ll come back here and rate some articles, or comment on/edit some of the lesson plans.

The bigger picture is that there aren’t a lot of good helicopter T-shirts out there. Try Googling “helicopter T-shirt” and you get a deluge of truly lame T-shirts from CafePress and Zazzle. They suck, and you can waste hours trying to find one that isn’t shameful. So it’s a good advertising opportunity. Anybody who runs that search will find FL005 (eventually), and on every page at FL005, you’ll find a link back to wikiRFM. FL005 will draw more traffic back here. That’s the plan anyway.

If you have time, check out FL005.com, poke around the site, and let me know what you think.